CONSOLIDATED CAVE MANAGEMENT - CAN IT BE ACHIEVED?
INTRODUCTION
This paper derives a certain inspiration from a paper delivered at the Seventh Conference by Dave Williams of Waitomo Caves, entitled "Tourist caves, who should manage them?" The focus of this paper will be to examine the structure of cave management in Australasia, particularly in political and economic terms. It will attempt to identity problems, examine differing approaches and suggest possible solutions and strategies.
While, clearly, the scope of this paper can possibly be applied to the economic and political management of any karst landform, the emphasis is on commercially developed caves.
The Current Situation
A review of the management authorities controlling commercially operated caves in Australia provides a diverse picture. By my count, there are 23 commercial tourist cave operations in Australia and 8 in New Zealand. These 31 operations are controlled by 22 different operators; government and non-government. It is useful to examine these figures on a regional basis. New South Wales has 6 commercial systems and 4 operators, Queensland 3 systems and 3 operators, Victoria 3 systems and 2 operators, South Australia 3 systems and 1 operator, Western Australia 3 systems and 3 operators, Tasmania 3 systems and 2 operators, Northern Territory 1 system and 1 operator and New Zealand 8 systems and 6 operators. Clearly, in an historical sense, this massive diversity of control has led to varied standards of development and karst management.
In order to proceed with this study, given the raw data just presented, one needs to make some assumptions. Therefore, I will assume that a reduction in the number of controlling bodies in commercial cave management would be desirable from various points of view - the main viewpoint being that the aim of any exercise should be gaining equivalent standards in development and management.
The Philosophic Approach
The fragmented nature of cave management control can lead to a divergence in philosophy and thus in approach. This is manifested in various forms. Take New South Wales as an example. This State possesses commercial development at six locations, with four different controlling management authorities. One of these is the Tourism Commission of New South Wales, controlling Abercrombie, Wombeyan and Jenolan. Its philosophic position on cave management can be judged, somewhat, by its name. The Tourism Commission is charged by the New South Wales Government with making a profit. By way of contrast, the New South Wales National Parks and Wildlife Service, controlling Yarrangobilly Caves, has a philosophic position based largely on conservation and land management. One must hasten to add that I do not accuse Tourism Commission management of having no interest in conservation. Rather, the philosophic position of the two bodies indicates a different emphasis in karst management. In definite terms we are talking about, essentially, public capitalism applied to karst management, as opposed to a non-profit government exercise.
The third type of controlling body is private enterprise whose philosophic approach, by definition, is profit. In terms of debating the desirability or otherwise of consolidating cave management, it therefore becomes an issue to decide which of the three types of controlling body, or perhaps combination, is appropriate in Australasia. However, in order to expand the argument, we must move from philosophic position to economics.
The Economic Approach
The three philosophic positions of the varying controlling management bodies largely predisposes an economic approach, and bound up with economics is the question of funding both for development and conservation purposes. A controlling body not expected to make a profit further than covering costs, such as some National Park and Wildlife Service agencies, would seem to have received, historically, less funds for cave development than government authorities given to public capitalism. Governments, regardless of political colour, usually tend to invest where they see the greater advantage to the public purse. Be that as it may, few involved in karst management would suggest that any cave system is overfunded and developed to its desirable potential. The attainment of funds and, even more importantly, the dispersion of those funds, is the crucial issue. This leads us to the crucial question. Are two caves more efficiently administered than one? Should, for example, all New South Wales caves be managed by one controlling body? If so, is this feasible? What are the advantages? What are the disadvantages? I will come to these questions shortly.
What Type of Control?
Before dealing directly with the issues inherent in management consolidation we need to examine what type of control, or controls, are the most desirable. To do so a reference to historical examples would seem appropriate.
Public Capitalism
The majority of commercial cave systems in Australia operate under some form of public capitalism. Some are administered through semi-government authorities, and some by local government authorities. However, at least until very recent years, these bodies while charged with making a profit have directed all income to consolidated revenue. Conversely, the capital input to any particular system received for development and conservation purposes has rarely borne any relationship to revenue. of course, in some cases, where a particular system in isolation makes an operating loss this is not prima facie a bad thing. Regardless, the question is simply one of whether consolidation would make more funds, or less, available for development and conservation.
It is as well to note that in recent years public capitalism in cave management has, in some instances, moved a step further. The South Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service has made its various regions self-funding. Thus, unlike the past where derived income disappeared into consolidated revenue, income above operating expenses can now be used to fund development and conservation. This is already proving successful and larger overall funding is now available. As well, funding priorities can now be more effectively identified and applied. The caves under the Tourism Commission of New South Wales are also about to be transferred to a new regime under an analogous system. Already, Caves House at Jenolan has been "privatised".
Non-Profit Government Control
This type of control, often directly by a government department, required all income to be directed to consolidated revenue and all funding for development and conservation must be "fought for" as part of a budget allocation. No reference, therefore, is made to a system's commercial viability. If it makes a profit, it does not gain. Of course, conversely, if it makes a loss it doesn't lose. Another line of argument, of course, is whether certain caves should be commercial operations, whether from a conservation or financial viability point of view. However, such a discussion is outside the scope of this paper, where the current situation warrants our attention.
Historically, the problem with what I term as non-profit government management is that funding outside operating expenses has been poor, or at least comparably poorer than for systems operating under public capitalism. There are exceptions to the rule and perhaps grey areas, but it would be difficult, at least in Australia.
Private Enterprise Control
Should we sell all our caves to Alan Bond or Kerry Packer and be done with it? In our part of the world, private ownership of commercial caves is not common. To my knowledge, we have three (not including a couple of private leaseholds). These are Shades of Death Cave at Murrindal, Victoria; and Olsens' and Cammoo Caves near Mt Etna in Queensland. The experience here is of small under-funded operations. Each of these three are operated by people who have considerable knowledge and experience in matters karst and profits tend to be largely absorbed by further developments.
In order to assess the potential and effects of large scale private enterprise control we need to look at experience well outside our region. I did so to some extent in my paper "Tourist Caves in Europe" (Cave Management VII). Basically, my observations led me to conclude that large scale private enterprise development in Europe, while generally resulting in excellent facilities for tourists, did not often take into account what we would consider to be sound basic management principles. As well, commercialism has led in many cases to the development of caves on the commercial desirability of its location and ease of development, not on its suitability for development from a scientific and conservation point of view. Thus you often see totally unsuitable caves in the first place, receiving huge volumes of traffic. Of course, large investments warrant mass advertising which maximises visitation and profits. The other problem is that it is not cost-effective to develop a number of suitable caves to share a visitation load, only one. Thus, in France for example, there are many tourist caves, but never more than one at any location open to the public.
In short, while large scale private enterprise does offer a high level of funding, overseas experience suggests that this is not necessarily channelled into areas we would consider as appropriate, or desirable, in terms of proper cave management.
In summary, when considering what type of control, past experience, both here and overseas, would tend to suggest that the most appropriate form of control should be public capitalism. Certainly South Australia and New South Wales as just two examples have already moved in this direction. Happily, political will and the interests of cave management seem to be converging in some areas.
The Political Problem
In having examined to some extent the philosophy and economics of cave management, and identified what appears to be the most appropriate form of management control, we now come to an examination of the political situation. In doing so, I return to my earlier questions; are two caves more efficiently administered than one? Should cave management be consolidated? If so, how far? On a State basis? Nationally? What is desirable? What can be achieved?
On the first question, I think there is little argument. It is cheaper and more efficient, from just about all management points of view including conservation, to run two caves better than one. How far do you extend this? Certainly, the evidence of uneven, even slap-dash development in the past certainly focuses the mind on the possibilities of consolidation, of setting widespread funding priorities in a host of management and conservation areas, in providing a realistic career structure, something that is almost totally lacking anywhere in Australasian cave management, in pooling talent and resource skills and in generally promoting cost effective management; thereby releasing more funds for the things we all care about.
Of course, the opposing argument could be that diversity in management is good and beneficial. If all caves were centrally controlled, flexibility might be lost in many areas, management structures and policies might become too rigid and might be placed in too few hands, perhaps?
Even so, regardless of the extent to which one considers consolidation should stretch, it is sobering to examine the political realities. Firstly, we can state that as privately owned caves represent only a very small percentage of the equation, we can practically dismiss them from calculations. In Australia, the parochialism of various state governments would probably make interstate consolidation very difficult to achieve, even if such were desirable.
Personally, I would favour state by state consolidation. In some cases, this would provide enough commercial karst resources to be a commercially viable entity, able to be self-funding, self-developing and with an appropriate career and management structure.
Of course, South Australian caves are already consolidated, but only under the wider authority of the South Australia National Parks and Wildlife Service. In New South Wales under the new regime now emerging in that State, it is more than possible that overall consolidation of commercial resources will be achieved. Tasmania is consolidated already, sort of but not under a public capitalism regime. This may come if the example of South Australia and New South Wales is followed. There are certainly consolidation possibilities in Western Australia, although the private enterprise operations in Queensland and New Zealand would seem to preclude complete success in these areas. Victoria has the problem of its two publicly controlled commercial operations being at opposite ends of the State. Few would argue that Princess Margaret Rose would be better administered in combination with the South Australian caves.
Overall, I have come to the view that consolidation is an area which should be actively pursued and that while it is possible a few disadvantages might be identifiable, the inherent advantages far outweigh these. In any case the area is one clearly meriting considerable thought by all those involved, in whatever way, in cave management in Australasia.
A Hypothetical Scenario
In conclusion, let me put to you an hypothetical example of consolidation just from an economic standpoint taking visitation figures in Australia; making a few reasonable assumptions; and projecting a few costings. Taking visitation figures across Australia as of 1981 (the latest available to me), we have approximately 315,000 in New South Wales; 110,000 in Victoria; 113,000 in South Australia; 32,000 in Queensland; 165,000 in Western Australia; 80,000 in Tasmania; and 9,000 in the Northern Teritory - giving a total of 825,000 visitors per year. Eight years on, allowing a modest 5% increase, we could roughly put visitation at Australian commercial caves in 1989 at about 870,000. Given an average entrance fee per head of $5, you have an income from visitation alone of just on $4.4 million. While clearly, I have not studied outgoings, without even considering the cost-savings in any consolidation, one could probably run "Australian Caves Incorporated", with profit for development, on that turnover ...